Dissent on convergence: the role of public factors, international trade and path dependence by Ziesemer, T.H.W.
  
 
Dissent on convergence: the role of public factors,
international trade and path dependence
Citation for published version (APA):
Ziesemer, T. H. W. (1996). Dissent on convergence: the role of public factors, international trade and path
dependence. (MERIT Research Memoranda; No. 004). Maastricht: MERIT, Maastricht Economic
Research Institute on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/1996
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
1DISSENT ON CONVERGENCE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC FACTORS, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND PATH DEPENDENCE
THOMAS ZIESEMER, Rijksuniversiteit Limburg Maastricht, Department
of Economics and MERIT, NL 6200 MD Maastricht.
1. Introduction
The distribution of world income across countries would
approach an egalitarian one if countries with a lower level of
the gross national product (GNP) had a higher growth rate of
their GNP. Whether or not this convergence from low to high
levels of GNP can be expected has been the subject of debate for
a long time. Nowadays this debate takes place under the header
of ’convergence’; in earlier days it was called the question of
development and underdevelopment.
Optimists on this question tend to present evidence as in
Figure 1. For this sample of countries we see that countries with
a lower level of productivity in 1870 had higher growth rates
from 1870 to 1979. The sceptics include more countries. This is
shown in Figure 2. This figure no longer shows an obvious
tendency towards convergence. On the contrary, it is remarkable
here that among low income countries we see the broadest range
of growth rates. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992, Table III)1
indeed show that the tests for unconditional convergence yield
a tendency towards convergence for the OECD sample but not for
their two larger samples.
However, this does not mean that the convergence view is
completely wrong. Mankiw (1995), based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1991) and MRW (1992), defends the convergence idea. Once one
corrects for different savings rates and rates of population
growth, they argue, the convergence view is correct.
This argument is presented more precisely using the
neoclassical growth model. The neoclassical growth model
considers convergence from the point of view of capital
accumulation. The capital-labour ratio k = K/AL, with K the stock
of capital, A the stock of technical knowledge and L the
exogenous labour hours, often called population, grows at rate2
With a linear homogeneous production function for capital and
(1.1)ˆk Kˆ Aˆ Lˆ
efficient labour, Y = F(K, AL), a constant savings ratio, s, and
investment equal to savings, the rate of growth of the capital
stock can be written as
1Henceforth this reference is abbreviated as MRW.
2A hat indicates a growth rate of the variable in question.
2For Figure 1 see Baumol, W.J. (1986), Productivity Growth,
Convergence and Welfare: What the Long-Run Data Show, American
Economic Review, 1072-85.
For Figure 2 see Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman (1991), Innovation
and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press,
p.3.
Insertion of the rate of growth of the capital stock into the
(1.2)Kˆ s F ( K, A L ) / K
3equation for the growth rate of the capital-labour ratio yields
This is drawn in Figure 3. The vertical difference between the
(1.3)ˆk s F ( K , A L ) / K Aˆ Lˆ
two curves is the growth rate of the capital-labour ratio. The
model economy moves to k*. The lower the initial value of the
capital-labour ratio, the higher the growth rate and the more
time it takes until the steady state is reached, up to a certain
percentage.3 Using alpha as the production elasticity of
capital, the growth rate of per capita GNP for this closed
economy model can be written as
In the steady state the growth rate of the capital-labour ratio
(1.4)Yˆ Lˆ Aˆ α ˆk
is zero and the economy would grow at the growth rate of A.
Outside the steady state the second term is positive and
therefore the growth rate is higher the greater the distance
between k and k*, i.e., if the country is poorer it grows more
quickly. If countries had identical savings ratios and identical
rates of population growth they would grow to the same k*,
provided that they have the same elasticities of production and
the same rate of technical progress. The latter is an assumption
made by MRW, who interpret technology as an international public
good.
Mankiw (1995) defends this model as realistic because MRW
(1992) obtained an adjusted R2= 0.59 for the steady state version
of the model. This may come as a surprise for the reader who is
familiar with the MRW paper. There the result for the OECD sample
is a rather poor adjusted R2= 0.06 and an elasticity of
production for capital of 0.6, whereas the authors expect 1/3 as
a realistic result based on income statistics. Mankiw argues that
human capital should be included here instead of in labour
income. The MRW model then is augmented by endogenous human
capital and the convergence process, which results in an adjusted
R2 = 0.66 for the OECD sample, 0.46 for the non-oil sample
consisting of 98 countries and 0.44 for an intermediate sample
omitting small countries. Whereas the result for the OECD
countries is what one would expect on the basis of Figure 1, we
see that as soon as developing countries are in the sample the
result is much worse.
The purpose of this paper is to present some arguments that
can explain the effects of differences between developed and
developing countries. Sharing Mankiw’s view that the Solow (1956)
3Note that in this model with an exogenous savings rate the
steady state is never reached but only an asymptotic result.
4model is the natural starting point4, some suggestions to
improve it are straightforward.5
First, as the central driving force, exogenous technical
progress is interpreted as a public good by MRW that is available
without cost and therefore identical across countries. Technical
progress and public goods should be endogenous because then they
are costly and it becomes clear what the implications of these
costs are. Growth rate effects of investment in public factors
are discussed in section 2 and level effects in section 3.
Second, with so much emphasis on capital accumulation in the
Solow model, one should be aware of the fact that at least non-
OECD countries are importers of capital goods. These imports have
to be paid for by exports either immediately, or later if debt
is incurred. Unless one imposes the perfectly unrealistic small
country assumption, export demand is limited, and the long-run
growth rate will be determined not only by technical progress but
also by income and price elasticities of export demand functions.
4Mankiw’s motivation is that the model is realistic. My
motivation is that the central institution of world economic
policy, the IMF, seems to believe, too, that the Solow model
gives us a good idea of what would happen to the long term
development if developing country governments behave efficiently.
In Ziesemer (1987) I have collected and developed models which
contain arguments suggesting that this neoclassical view is far
too optimistic. Its ignorance of many problems can lead to lower
growth rates than the Solow model would predict.
5For critical remarks concerning technology and
microfoundations see the comment of Paul Romer on Mankiw (1995).
5As there is little reason to believe that these are identical
across countries, identical steady-state growth rates cannot be
expected to prevail. This and other trade and capital movements
arguments will be discussed in section 4.
Finally, Figure 2 shows that quite a few countries have
negative growth rates of per capita income. Decreasing returns
to scale as well as path dependence models can explain this,
whereas the closed economy Solow model cannot. We present some
of these arguments in section 5.
2. Growth rate effects of endogenous public factors
Technical progress will be endogenized along the lines
suggested by T.W. Schultz (1964). It depends on human capital
which in turn depends on the public factors basic education and
basic scientific research. The more the government invests in
these public factors the more human capital will be produced by
households and the more technical progress will be generated by
firms.6 Ignoring physical capital for a moment, output is
assumed to be produced by a neoclassical production function
Y=F(H,AL1) where H is human capital, and the same notation as
above is used for the other variables. Technical progress is
generated by the neoclassical production function
Division by L1 indicates that human capital is less productive in
(2.1)˙A G(H/L1,A) g(h)A with h≡H/AL1
making technical progress the more workers there are to whom the
knowledge has to be transferred. The more knowledge the firm has
produced the more productive it is in doing so in the future.
This is indicated by the second argument. Human capital is
supplied by families i = 1, ..., N using heterogeneous
neoclassical production functions
Households use labour weighted by firm knowledge, individually
(2.2)Hi H(eiALi2,B)
different ability parameters ei and public factors B. Ability
parameters make these households different from each other, an
assumption that prevents the occurrence of an egalitarian income
distribution. The change in the stock of public factors is paid
by a flat rate income tax, t:
In equilibrium, demand for human capital H in the production and
(2.3)˙B tY
technical progress functions must be equal to the sum of
individual supplies Hi. Labour supply must be equal to the sum of
labour demand of the firm, L1, and the sum of labour used in
human capital production. It can be shown that in this model the
rate of technical progress will be higher the higher the flat
6For a more detailed explanation and analysis of the
following see Ziesemer (1995a).
6rate income tax.
This model ignores the distortion of taxes on capital
income because it neglects capital income altogether. In Shell
(1967) this distortion has a negative impact on the growth rate,
thus weakening the expenditure effect of having more public
factors. Empirically, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that this
distortive effect is insignificant, and Koester and Kormendi
(1989) find that income tax distortions have level effects but
no growth rate effects. The expenditure effect therefore is
empirically dominating and found by Otani and Villanueva (1990)
to be quantitatively as important as the rate of saving. They
find that for low and middle income countries, a 1 percentage
point increase in the ratio of government expenditure on human
capital to GNP would on average contribute a 0.5 percentage point
increase in the long-term per capita annual growth rate of
output.
Why then do countries’ governments not spend the same amount
on education? There are mainly two reasons for this. First,
taxation is a form of savings, and the inclination towards
savings may depend on the level of income. So far we would simply
be back to the conditional convergence argument: Since taxes
being parts of savings, their inclusion is a refinement of making
convergence conditional on savings by disaggregating savings into
their components. To this we will return below.
Second, different abilities ei in the human capital
production function generate a different marginal contribution
of public factors in households’ income formation. This is shown
in Figure 4, where the vertical intercept of the tangential lines
is equal to the marginal product of public factors in human
capital formation. Production functions drawn for higher
abilities have a higher vertical intercept. People with higher
abilities are more interested in a high level of public factors
and therefore have a higher willingness to pay. Unless there is
perfect information on the side of the government concerning
households’ marginal benefits from public factors, which would
allow for Lindahl taxes, there will be a distributional conflict:
People with higher abilities want higher flat rate taxes, people
with lower abilities want lower tax rates. The inclusion of
capital income would of course have an impact here: people with
higher capital income will c.p. desire lower levels of taxes. If
the political conflict is dominated by large capital income
owners or low ability people, the result will be a low rate of
taxation, a low level of public factors, scarce human capital and
a low rate of technical progress. From this argument alone there
is little reason to believe that countries will converge to the
same rate of technical progress in the long run, unless one
imposes the belief that the political decisions also converge in
the long run. However, in economics we have no such argument
available until now.
Although the results of Otani and Villanueva (1990) do not
contradict the view expressed in the model above, we cannot
distinguish whether their results hold for the steady state or
7only for transitional periods.7 In the latter case the tax
variable may have only a level effect. This is all the more the
case if there are no improvements at all in total factor
productivity of developing countries. This is a common view in
development economics that has recently been supported by Young
(1994). Young’s computations yield total factor productivity
increases for the period 1970-85 for 65 of 118 countries. Almost
half of the countries, therefore, may not have total factor
productivity improvements.8 However, even if the output
production does not have a total factor productivity term that
grows, a public factor in the production of one of the inputs may
generate a similar effect due to the non-rivalry of using the
public factor. These so- called level efects will be considered
in the next section. In future research this will be extended to
7Indeed the coefficient in question compared across three
groups of countries is lower the richer the group of countries
considered (see Otani and Villanueva 1990, Table 3).
8These estimates may be biased downwards because in the
ranking of countries, we have Switzerland in the 66th place with
no gain in total factor productivity. This result is hard to
believe. It raises the question of whether or not the
calculations have taken the degree of capacity utilization into
account or whether exchange rate problems haved biased these
calculations. A low degree of capacity utilization in the period
of time covering the two oil crises and the world recession after
1980 may be responsible for this low estimate. See also Morisson
1989 for the impact of the degree of capacity utilization on
estimates of total factor productivity.
8sector specific public factors, which may lead to an intermediate
position between laissez-faire and targeting.
3. Level effects of endogenous public factors
To analyze level effects, we drop A-terms from the previous
equations and introduce physical capital. The major argument to
be made is that private and public capital have to be well
balanced to allow for an optimal level of GNP per capita. The
output production function now becomes
The human capital production function remains the same as (2.2)
(3.1)Y KαHβL11 α β
above with A=1. The equation for the change in the stock of
public factors remains (2.3). An equation for the accumulation
of physical capital with symbols as above has to be added
In this model9 labour is allocated in proportion to the
(3.2)˙K s(1 t)Y
elasticities of production
All individual production functions in this model have constant
(3.3)L1/L2 (1 α β)/(ϕβ)
returns to scale. Inserting the results of the model into the
production function, it can be shown that the non-rivalry of
public factors in the human capital production function lead to
increasing returns in the aggregate production function
This function is homogenous of degree in K, B, L1 and
(3.4)Y Kα L2ei[B/(eiL2i)](1 ϕ) βL1(1 α β)
1 β(1 ϕ)
L2. Public factors’ elasticity of production is equal to the
degree of increasing returns to scale in the aggregate production
function because this elasticity reflects the productivity of the
non-rivalry property of public capital.
The long-run growth rate of this model is
The growth rate of human capital is larger than that of output,
(3.5a)Yˆ Kˆ Bˆ g≡ (1 α)n
1 α β(1 ϕ)>n
(3.5b)Hˆ n 1 α (1 ϕ)(1 α β)
1 α β(1 ϕ) > g > n
9See Ziesemer (1990) for more detailed motivations,
derivation and discussion of results.
9physical and public capital.10 The difference between the two is
(3.5c)wˆ Yˆ Lˆ1 Yˆ Lˆ β(1 ϕ)n1 α β(1 ϕ)
proportional to the elasticity of production of public capital
in human capital formation. The growth rate of real wages, labour
productivity and per capita income is equal to the number of
additional people using the public factors weighted by the
elasticity of production of public factors in final output.
A golden rule maximizing steady-state per capita consumption
can be shown to require
As in the steady state, we have gK=s(1-t) and gB=tY the
(3.6)t β(1 ϕ) and s α/[1 β(1 ϕ)] α/(1 t)
composition of capital in the steady state and under a golden
rule is
However, this optimal composition of capital is unlikely to be
(3.7)B/K t/s(1 t) β(1 ϕ)/α
achieved. The reason is as follows. In this model individuals are
allowed to differ with respect to their abilities ei, capital
endowment Ki and labour endowments. It can be shown that for an
individual with average abilities defined as a choice L2i/L = 1/N
and average income Yi =Y/N, a Lindahl tax is as high as the
golden rule tax. A person that has higher income or lower
abilities prefers a lower tax. If the distribution of total
income per unit of labour spent in education is such that the
median voter has a lower income per unit of labour spent in
education than the average person, he will prefer a higher flat
rate of taxation than the golden rule, leading to a lower growth
path. Tax rates that are very much higher or lower than the
golden rule and the median voter’s ideal tax rate will lead to
even greater deviations from the golden rule path. This is
summarized in Figure 5.
As Mankiw (1995) has analyzed the impact of the savings
ratio on the level of per capita income, we concentrate on the
impact of the composition of the two capital stocks, B/K, and the
two parts of total savings: the tax rate, t, and the private rate
of savings, s. In order to do so we assume that the aggregate
savings rate is at its optimal level
Solving this for s we get
(3.8)t s(1 t) β(1 ϕ) α
10It should be clear that the argument of public factors
increasing human capital are less relevant if there is educated
unemployment because wage policy prevents human capital prices
from falling. However, the more economies are deregulated under
the guidance of the IMF policies, the more relevant are the
arguments of this paper which have been formulated for
undistorted economies.
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If the denominator is required to be positive, the tax rate has
(3.9)s [α β(1 ϕ) t]/(1 t)
an upper bound of alpha plus the rate of increasing returns.
Under the assumption of optimal aggregate savings, this implies
that any change in the tax rate will be accompanied by an
opposite change in the rate of private savings as given below by
ds/dt=-(1-s)/(1-t)
As the labour allocation is independent of the rates of savings
and taxation, and for the purpose of analyzing the impact of a
change in the rate of taxation given optimal total savings, the
aggregate production function (3.4) can be rewritten as
Inserting of the steady state results gK=s(1-t)Y and gB=tY for
(3.10)Y KαB(1 ϕ)βΓ
K and B, respectively, into (3.10), after dividing both equations
by g, replacing the savings ratio by (3.9) and solving for Y,
yields
This is the aggregate production function for the steady state
(3.11)Y [α β(1 ϕ) t]
g
α
[1 α β(1 ϕ)]( t
g
)
β(1 ϕ)
1 α β(1 ϕ) Γ
as a function of the tax rate, but only under the precondition
that the aggregate savings rate is optimal as in (3.9), where the
latter assumption ensures that only the structural effect of the
tax rate is taken into account. Increasing the tax rate increases
11
the value of B in the second term but decreases the value of K
in the first term. The elasticity of output with respect to the
tax rate can be computed as
This elasticity equals
(3.12)
Yt
[ αt
α β(1 ϕ) t β(1 ϕ)]
[1 α β(1 ϕ)]
i) for t=0,(1 ϕ)β
1 α β(1 ϕ)
ii) zero for the golden rule tax andt β(1 ϕ)
iii) minus infinity for the tax value fort α β(1 ϕ)
which s=0.
In words, for taxes lower than the golden rule, the elasticity
with respect to output is positive because it improves the
composition of capital, changing it into the direction of a
golden rule. At the golden rule it is of course zero. At tax
rates higher than the golden rule, output decreases. Investment
in public factors, tY, has its maximum value at an elasticity of
(-1), where . If the elasticity is smallert (1 α)[α β(1 ϕ)]
than (-1) there is a Laffer effect: decreasing the tax rate
increases output more than proportionately such that tax revenues
increase.
These exercises show that not only the level of savings
matters, but also the size of the government, measured by the
share of public investment. This adds another condition besides
the savings ratios and rates of population growth taken into
account by MRW. An estimate by Koester and Kormendi (1989) shows
that ∂(Y/L)/∂t = 2.48, meaning that an increase by 1 percentage
point (dt=1%) increases the GDP per capita on average by $248,
which is 8.6% of the median per capita income of their sample of
$2880 in 1975 U.S. dollars. By interpreting the numbers using the
calculations of the model presented above, this means that the
actual tax rates are on average below that of the golden rule
value in a cross section of countries.
As wages income, wL1, is a constant share of output,it will
also be higher under a higher rate of taxation. The same results
holds for non-capital income, wL1 + qH = (1 - α)Y. Higher
investment in public factors therefore can, at least partly,
answer the question posed in the discussion of Mankiw (1995) why
a household migrating from Mexico to the US earns more in the
latter. As long as the percentage increase of per capita income
is higher then the percentage point change of the tax rate this
also holds for the post-tax income.
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4. International trade and factor movements
Using a closed economy Solow model ignores that capital
goods are imported by developing countries and therefore have to
be paid by exports either immediately or later if debt is
incurred. Therefore we show the impact of income and price
elasticities of export demand on the long-run growth rate. As
these elasticities can hardly be expected to be equal across
countries, this provides another argument against the assumption
of identical steady-state growth rates across countries.
The importance of capital goods imports has been pervasive
throughout Prebisch’s (1950, 1961) and Singer’s (1950, 1958,
1991) papers and today is a common argument in the whole of the
literature on dependency theory.
A first step in examining the consequences of the
introduction of imported capital goods into the neoclassical
growth model has been made by Bardhan and S. Lewis (1970). The
model presented below11 contains several modifications of theirs
in a simplified way. Both do not try to explain the importation
of capital goods but rather examine its consequences for the
terms of trade, capital accumulation and real wage growth.
As in the previous model a Cobb-Douglas function is used
with b as the rate of technical progress and all the other
(4.1)Y ebtKβL1 β or Yˆ b βKˆ (1 β)Lˆ
symbols the same as in the previous model. Labour is assumed to
grow at an exogenously given rate n as in the previous model
An important problem for developing countries seems to be
(4.2)L(t) L(0)ent or Lˆ n
that the international allocation is such that they are importers
of capital goods. This problem is repeatedly mentioned in
Prebisch’s papers (1950, pp. 12,17; 1961, pp.5,11,12). We assume
that only capital goods are imported. By assumption, capital
goods invested in each period, denoted by , must be imported,˙K
and there are no other imports such that , where M denotesM ˙K
imports. Since imports are assumed to consist of capital goods
only, the trade balance equilibrium requires that they are paid
for by exports. So investment is limited by exports X, valued in
terms of imported capital goods (see Prebisch, 1950, p.2)
where p is the terms of trade, i.e., the price of domestic goods
(4.3)
˙K/K pX/K or Kˆ^ pˆ Xˆ Kˆ
11The model is a slightly modified version of Ziesemer
(1987, Chap.7.5), which has been applied to the discussion of the
Prebisch-Singer Thesis in Ziesemer (1995b) and to the debt crises
in Ziesemer (1996).
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in terms of the imported capital goods. Investment has to be
financed by domestic savings measured in units of imported
capital goods. Again a constant rate of savings, s, from national
output is assumed
Investment, being limited by exports, cannot grow faster than
(4.4)
spY/K ˙K/K or Kˆ^ pˆ Yˆ Kˆ
exports. Exports are assumed to depend on customer countries’
income Z and the terms of trade p. The reader is reminded that
Prebisch assumed a low income elasticity of export demand
(Prebisch, 1959, pp.251/2) and a price elasticity greater than
minus infinity, (1961, p.5) and even greater than minus one; in
short, he assumed low income and price elasticities of export
demand (1959, p.256). Faini et. al (1992, Hentschel (1992) and
Stern, Francis and Schumacher (1976) found indeed that the values
of price elasticities of exports are in the neighbourhood of
minus one. As we will see later, low elasticities of export
demand may be the reason for slow investment growth and other
important variables if capital goods are imported. To ease
computation the export function is assumed to be log-linear
rho is the income elasticity and eta the price elasticity of
(4.5)X eωtpη or X Zρpη and X ω η pˆ ρZˆ ηpˆ
export demand. The first formulation is the one used by Bardhan
and Lewis (1970), and the second is used in the models of
Thirlwall (1983). Both formulations are equivalent if .
This equivalence allows us to relate the Bardhan- Lewis model to
the Prebisch-Singer problem of low elasticities. Given wage and
interest rates, the usual marginal productivity conditions for
competitive markets from profit maximization hold
where w is the wage rate measured in units of foreign goods and
(4.6)r p e
btβ Kβ 1L1 β or rˆ pˆ b (β 1)(Kˆ Lˆ)
w p ebt Kβ(1 β)L β or wˆ pˆ b β(Kˆ Lˆ)
w/p is the wage rate measured in units of domestic goods.
Inserting the growth rate versions of the production function and
the export function into the savings and the export constraint
for investment, (4.3) and (4.4), yields
The wage rate--used as a rough indicator of welfare here--will
(4.3’)Kˆ^ pˆ ρZˆ ηpˆ Kˆ
(4.4’)Kˆ^ pˆ b βKˆ (1 β)Lˆ Kˆ
grow at the same rate at which the marginal productivity of
labour grows. The latter is determined by the rate of technical
14
progress and the growth rate of the capital-labour ratio,
henceforth defined as k≡K/L
The rate of technical progress being given exogenously, the
(4.7)wˆ pˆ b βˆk
critical point is whether the growth rate of the capital-labour
ratio is slowed down by low export elasticities, which in turn
limit imports of capital goods. The solution of the model in
terms of growth rates for the long-run equilibrium growth path
interpreted below, can be obtained as follows. Solving (4.4’) for
and inserting it into (4.3’) yields, after some manipulation
In the plane this is a linear differential equation with
(4.3’’)Kˆ^ ρZˆ (1 η)b (1 η)(1 β)nη
β η(1 β)
η Kˆ
(Kˆ^,Kˆ)
a negative slope. A price-elastic export demand function is a
sufficient condition for obtaining positive intercepts (drawn in
Figure 1). Setting =0 and going back to the other equations,Kˆ^
the solution for the terms of trade, the capital-labour ratio and
real wages can be computed as follows
As the denominator is positive for all three equations, the
(4.8)pˆ [(ρZˆ n)(1 β) b]/[ η(1 β) β]
(4.9)ˆk [ρZˆ n (1 η)b]/[ η(1 β) β]
(4.10)wˆ pˆ [(ρZˆ n)β ηb]/[ η(1 β) β]
interpretation will first focus on the numerator, and thereafter
(4.8) and (4.10) will be drawn in Figures 6 and 7. This
demonstrates the dependence of the terms of trade and the real
wage on the income elasticity of exports, ρ, for alternative
values of the price elasticity of exports η. The numerator in
(4.8)-(4.10) is the sum of two terms. The first term captures the
"engine of growth" part in the spirit of Prebisch, Singer and
Myrdal, but also Lewis and others. That is, customer countries’
income growth multiplied by the income elasticity drives the
growth rates of the terms of trade, capital-labour ratios and the
wage rate. The second term captures the "handmaiden" part of the
story, made possible here through the explicit introduction of
technical progress in the Bardhan-Lewis model. This is more in
the spirit of Kravis (1970) who argued that exports are merely
driven by the price decreasing effects of technical progress.
Therefore the causality goes from growth to exports and not the
other way around, as emphasized by the ’engine of growth’
proponents. This view has recently been supported by Evans
15
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(1987). Evans assumes that capital goods could be produced within
the South. However, the assumption that they are not is crucial
to the way in which this paper perceives the P-S thesis. This
model contains both features which will be discussed in greater
detail now.
The benefits from technical progress may be described as
follows: The immediate effect of technical progress is to reduce
production costs; it reduces the terms of trade in (4.8). This
was recognized by Prebisch (1950, p.5, fn.4). The question now
is, whether this effect will lead to increasing or decreasing
exports and investment. If exports are price-elastic they will
be increased and will therefore enhance the rate of growth of the
capital-labour ratio in (4.9). If exports are price-inelastic,
technical progress, by decreasing the terms of trade, has a
negative effect on the rate of growth of the capital-labour ratio
in (4.9). Now technical progress has a direct and an indirect
influence on the real wage growth rate, the indirect effect
resulting via the capital-labour ratio. It can be seen that the
direct effect outweighs the indirect effect as in (4.10).
Nevertheless, the less price elastic the export demand function
is, the smaller the contribution of technical progress to real
wage growth.12 In the limit, if price elasticities were zero,
there would be no influence of technical progress on the growth
rate of the real wage rate. To summarize, technical progress has
a negative impact on the terms of trade and a non-negative
influence on real wages. As there is little reason to believe
that countries will have identical price elasticities, even if
they had identical rates of technical progress, it is implausible
to expect identical long-run growth rates across countries.
A second argument why one should not expect identical long-
run growth rates is that the income elasticity of export demand
and customer countries’ income growth, , cannot be expected
to be identical across countries. A higher income elasticity
yields a higher growth of export demand for each given growth
rate of customer countries’ income. It also leads to higher
growth rates of capital imports in (4.9), leading to higher real
wage growth in (4.10) and therefore higher growth rates of the
terms of trade in (4.8). A critical problem is whether the
increase of exports, induced by the rate of growth of customer
countries’ income, , is higher than the rate of population
growth because the difference determines the rate of growth of
12Note that this argument refers only to the term in the
numerator, i.e., the role of the price elasticity with respect
to technical progress. The total effect of varying the price
elasticity on real wages can be seen from Figure 6. For a given
income elasticity a higher price elasticity decreases the real
wage growth rate if the income elasticity is larger than one. It
increases it if it is smaller than one, because a higher price
elasticity implies a lower terms of trade gain (to the right of
the intersection point in Figure 7) or loss (to the left of the
intersection point) for any given value of other variables.
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the capital-labour ratio in (4.9). If the difference between the
product just mentioned and the rate of population growth is
negative because of a low income elasticity of export demand, ρ,
this will have a negative impact on the terms of trade, the
capital-labour ratio and real wage growth. So, the terms of
trade, the capital-labour ratio and the real wage, all depend on
the income elasticity of export demand in the same way (see
Prebisch, 1959, p.258).
A comparison with the results of the Solow growth model is
an essential point of this paper and is therefore carried out
next. In the closed neoclassical growth model with a production
function as in (4.1), the real wage, the capital-labour ratio and
per capita income grow at the rate b/(1-β). The impact of income
and price elasticities can be summarized by rearranging (4.10)
such that it has two components: the steady-state growth rate of
the neoclassical model and a term containing income and price
elasticities. The result is
Obviously, a higher income elasticity of export demand has a
(4.11)wˆ pˆ b(1 β)
(ρZˆ n)β βb/(1 β)
η(1 β) β
positive impact on the growth rate, and a price elasticity that
is higher in absolute terms has a negative impact. There are two
special cases in which the neoclassical result can be derived
from (4.11)
1 For η equal to minus infinity we have for allwˆ pˆ b/(1 β)
values of . This is the neoclassical small country case.ρZˆ
2. If we assume that the world as a whole grows like a closed
Solow economy at the rate then we find
In this case the engine of growth is as fast as the
(4.12)wˆ pˆ b/(1 β) and pˆ 0, both if ρ 1
handmaiden, b/(1-β).
is drawn in Figure 6 as a function of ρ under the
assumption of for alternative values of η 13.Zˆ n b/(1 β)
Whereas the small country case--drawn as a horizontal line in
Figure 6--reflects the predominant traditional neoclassical view
that exports do not limit growth (see Donges and Riedel, 1977),
the second case reminds us of a paper by Seers (1962), who argued
that growth differences are due to differences in the income
13For the derivation (4.10’) and (4.11) have been used;
vertical intercepts and slopes are derived in Appendix I of
Ziesemer 1995b.
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elasticities of export demand. Figure 6 shows that an income
elasticity lower (higher) than one yields lower (higher) growth
rates than in the Solow model if capital goods are imported and
the price elasticity is not minus infinity. The impact of the
income elasticity on the growth rate is still higher if exports
are less price elastic, because then price movements have a less
smoothing impact on growth rates.
As the model is not only driven by technical progress but
by exports as well, a similar relation between the terms of trade
and the income elasticity of export demand is drawn in Figure 7
14
. Whenever the income elasticity of export demand is smaller
than one, the terms of trade fall and the real wage grows slower
than in the Solow economy, thus showing the close relationship
between real wages and terms of trade development. Both are
governed by the income elasticity of export demand, whose impact
is increased (decreased) through lower (higher) price elasticity
of export demand.
Capital goods importation and low elasticities of export
demand were the main issues presented by Prebisch (1950, 1959)
and Singer (1950, 479). Nothing in the model depends on primary
products, which were used as an example in the 1950’s, although
primary products are still of great importance (see Barros and
Amazonas 1993, p. 99-102, and Hoffmann and Zivkovic 1992). The
strong growth of (semi-)manufactured industry goods is also a
broadly accepted fact in recent years (see Donges and Riedel 1977
and Sapsford, Sarkar and Singer 1992). What matters are
elasticities of export demand--regardless of the nature of the
products--and their impact on real wages and per capita income
as a measure of poverty or wealth. Income elasticities of export
demand seem to favour differential growth rates because different
countries specialize in different products which have different
income elasticities of demand. Finally, the model allows for
decreasing, constant and increasing growth in the terms of trade
and therefore may provide a good basis for empirical research.
In this sense we hope that the model may be viewed as a step
towards an improved basis of formal theorizing for empirical
research. However, it cannot be expected that empirical research
will find identical steady state growth rates as assumed in the
conditional convergence view of MRW.
A first impression can be obtained from recent estimates of
long-run trends in terms of trade development. The order of
magnitude under discussion is a fall in the terms of trade
between zero and 0.8%.15 The second term in (4.11) has the same
sign as the terms of trade result (4.8). This means that even if
the total factor productivity increases at the same percentage
rate in all countries of the world as in the first term of
(4.11), the second term is negative for many countries which
import capital goods but have falling terms of trade. Note that
14For a derivation (4.11) has been used and vertical
intercepts and slopes are derived in Appendix II of Ziesemer
1995b.
15See Cuddington and Urzua (1989), Ardeni and Wright (1992),
Bleany and Greenaway (1993) and Barros and Amazonas (1993).
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there is no compelling reason for the specialization assumed to
vanish under falling terms of trade. In the vein of Ricardian
theory, the specialization is robust if the relative total factor
productivities are falling even faster than the terms of trade.
In the vein of Heckscher-Ohlin theory, one could think of capital
goods as being human capital intensive, a factor that remains
relatively abundant in the developed countries.
To summarize, low income and price elasticities lead to low
growth rates and may even make the growth rates of the terms of
trade, the capital-labour ratio and the real wage rate negative
in (4.8)-(4.10). It is unreasonable to expect identical price and
income elasticities of export demand and therefore no convergence
towards steady states with identical growth rates can be
expected.
A second reason for not having identical growth rates has
been presented by Grossman and Helpman (1991). In a dynamic
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, they argue, that growth rates are
produced by an R&D sector with human capital intensive
technology. Therefore, a country that is human capital abundant
can be expected to have a higher growth rate than a less human
capital abundant country. If international trade equalizes factor
prices, capital mobility would not change the result. The more
human capital abundant country is and will remain richer. If
factor prices are not equalized by trade alone, interest rates
may be too high to allow poor countries to do any R&D at all.
Again, identical long-run growth rates cannot be expected to
prevail.
The endogenization of R&D by Grossman and Helpman (1991)
undermines the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin result on convergence
of Fischer and Frenkel (1974), who argued that two growing
Heckscher-Ohlin economies, allowing for capital movements, would
immediately equalize their GDPs and in the long run also their
GNPs. This is because the poorer country, having the same savings
ratio as the richer country by assumption, would in the long run
own as much capital as the initially richer country. In the long
run both countries are absolutely identical, trade is balanced
and capital movements vanish. There are no gains from trade in
the long run; they all accrue in the transition to but not at the
steady state.
Given the fairly well developed state of modelling exogenous
growth with international capital movements16, it is somewhat
surprising that MRW used a closed economy model. Obviously, the
reason is that under perfect capital movements used in most of
the models, profit maximizing firms, equating their marginal
product of capital to the world market interest rate, fix the
capital-efficient labour ratio. As a consequence, the capital-
labour ratio, output per capita and real wages grow at the rate
of technical progress immediately. There is no transition because
the unretarded inflow of capital is tantamount to a jump to a new
steady state. But having a transition process is essential in MRW
to get good empirical results.
Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin (1995) are aware of this
16See Ziesemer (1995c, Chap.3), for a survey of these models
developed in the sixties and seventies.
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deficiency of the MRW paper. They show that a credit constrained
economy, defined as one in which only part of the capital stock
can serve as collateral, can have almost the same properties as
the closed economy. This gives, of course, more plausibility to
the empirical results.
However, it should be noted that the formal equivalence is
made for two totally different interpretations. What was physical
and human capital in the closed economy model, and the data used
in the empirical work, for the open economy, is redefined to be
collateralized and non-collateralized capital. One wonders with
which data this can be fulfilled and whether or not the results
would be as good as before. If two formally equivalent models
have different interpretations, and therefore need different data
sets to test them, the answer is far from obvious. However, the
point of departure in this paper was the fact that the adjusted
R2 was worse for a set of countries that include developing
countries. This result is seemingly also unaffected by the
transition to an open economy model.
In earlier models capital market imperfection had already
been taken into account. Hamada (1969) made spreads on the world
market interest rate dependent on the debt per capita. Countries
with higher debt pay higher spreads. As countries with higher
debt have lower wealth owned, this implies a higher marginal
product of capital for a poorer country as in the closed economy
model of Solow and MRW. Hamada’s model, therefore, would have
been the most straightforward tool for the MRW work. However,
Mankiw’s motivation was to defend the Solow model as empirically
relevant. Due to its closed economy nature, and the fact that the
USA itself has been built with UK capital as many developing
countries have financed their investment with US capital17, it
could have been made clear without sophisticated econometrics
that the value of the Solow model is didactical in nature. It is
a starting point for more sophisticated theorizing rather than
a realistic description of the mechanics of economic development.
Similarly, Ziesemer (1996) integrates debt and spreads into
the above Prebisch-Singer growth model, making them dependent on
variables that have turned out to be robust in the empirical
literature on country risk, creditworthiness and debt servicing
capacity. This also yields a transition process of the model to
the steady state. However, the steady-state growth rate is the
same as in the model presented above, and, therefore steady-state
growth rates will supposedly differ across countries. Therefore,
no convergence can be expected except for that of a country to
its own steady state. Empirical work on convergence under
conditions of international capital movements still has to be
done. The models of Hamada (1969), Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-
Martin (1995) are the most straightforward tools to do this.
However, for a group of countries that import capital goods,
separate estimates should be run with these models and with that
of Ziesemer (1996). If the latter yields better results than the
former, this would be evidence against convergence, because here
countries have different steady state growth rates.
17See Fishlow 1985 on the history of international debt and
development.
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5. Explaining negative growth rates: Trade again, population
growth and path dependence
Figure 2 shows sixteen countries with negative annual
average growth rates of per capita income for the period 1960-
85.18 The Solow model predicts positive growth rates for poor
countries unless extremely high values of population growth and
extremely low values of the rate of savings are assumed for a
given capital-labour ratio (see Figure 3). For poor countries
other models may be more adequate to explain these negative
rates, because it is difficult to imagine how a country can get
to a point k > k*.
However, if the production function is linear homogenous in
respect to capital, efficient labour and land, and land is non-
augmentable and normalized to unity, then we have decreasing
returns to capital and labour
This is a reasonable assumption for agrarian economies which are
(5.1)Y K
α(AL)β,α β<1
Yˆ αKˆ β(Aˆ Lˆ)
among the poorest.19 If investment equals savings with a
constant savings ratio, we get
Inserting the growth rate version of the production function into
(5.2)Kˆ sY/K or Kˆ^ Yˆ Kˆ
the growth rate version of the equality of investment and
savings, we get
This is drawn in Figure 8. The model is driven to a constant rate
(5.3)Kˆ^ αKˆ β(Aˆ Lˆ) Kˆ
of capital accumulation
Output per capita becomes
(5.4)Kˆ β(Aˆ Lˆ)
1 α
This equation has the familiar interpretation from Ricardo’s
theory. Unless technical progress is large enough to outweigh the
decreasing returns to scale entered because of population growth,
18Supposedly this number would be even higher if the whole
of the 1980s had been included, because they are well known as
the lost decade now.
19This is a simplified model of Jorgenson 1961. See Ziesemer
1987, chaps.4 and 5 for a more detailed discussion. The model
could also be written down with international capital movements.
For the sake of brevity this is not done here.
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per capita income will fall.
(5.5)
Yˆ Lˆ αKˆ βAˆ (β 1)Lˆ
α β(Aˆ Lˆ)
1 α
βAˆ (β 1)Lˆ
βAˆ (1 α β)Lˆ
1 α
A second explanation can be given using the Prebisch-Singer
growth model of the previous section. It is obvious from Figure
6 that a low income elasticity of export demand or customer
countries’ incomes can lead to negative growth rates.
Third, path dependent models with thresholds to development
are obvious candidates to explain negative growth rates. Models
with endogenous population growth and population trap are
legendary and need not be repeated here.
Fourth, path dependence in (endogenous) growth models can
be found very often (see Schneider and Ziesemer 1995). They all
have three steady states, two of which are stable and one of them
which is unstable. Unless the central variable of the model has
an initial value that is higher than the threshold value of the
unstable steady state, the economy will grow towards the low
level equilibrium trap and have negative growth rates in the
transition. The only model that has been constructed to explain
the growth of developing countries, the group for which the
convergence results of MRW are less satisfactory, however, is the
one by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990).
The essence of the model can be briefly described as
follows. The human capital of the child generation, Ht+1, is
dependent on the human capital of the parent generation, Ht, that
is used h hours, to educate children. The simplest way to write
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the education production function is Ht+1 = hHt. Parents,
determining the number of hours spent on education, h, take into
account that they could use their time alternatively for raising
more children with less education or offer their time on the
labour market. The more human capital a child has, the higher her
future utility. The utility of the future generation is taken
into account by altruistic parents, who give the future
generation a higher weight in their utility function the more
children there are. However, the weight given to each child is
decreasing per child. As a consequence of these assumptions,
parents who have little human capital are less productive in
education and prefer to have more children which will be less
educated, thus generating a higher weight to the future
generation, but a lower weight for each child. This latter lower
weight for each child implies also lower education. The time
spent on education, therefore, also depends on the given human
capital: h(Ht), with h’> 0. The production function now becomes
Ht+1 = h(Ht)Ht. In Ht+1-Ht space, this can be drawn as shown in
Figure 9. The slope is positive throughout: dHt+1/dHt=h’Ht + H >
0. The second derivative must change from positive to negative
because d2Ht+1/(dHt)=h’’Ht + 2h’ is positive for small Ht and
negative for large Ht if h’’<0. If parameters of the model are
such that the S-curve intersects the 45-degree line, the economy
will move as indicated by the arrows. The poor become poorer, the
rich become richer. If some countries start above and others
below the threshold value, the result is called divergence, .
6. Summary and conclusion
Starting from the fact that the MRW results yields a lower
adjusted R2 for samples larger than that of the OECD, we have
concluded that there must be arguments specific to developing
countries which can explain this difference in explanatory power.
The following arguments have been presented.
We have shown that endogenizing public factors attributes
a special role to tax resistance and the structure of public
expenditure. A lower share of public expenditure on education may
lead to a lower steady state growth rate in the model of section
2 and a lower share of public investment in GNP may lead to a
lower level of per capita income in the model of section 3.
Taking into account that capital goods are imported, the
model of section 4 shows the long-run growth rate to include
income and price elasticities of export demand, which must be
expected to differ across countries.
Endogenization of R&D in dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) must be expected to yield different
long-run growth rates as well.
The empirical investigation of models with international
capital movements is a totally open issue.
Finally, explanation of negative growth rates is much more
plausible in models of i) decreasing returns, ii) the Prebisch-
Singer model of section 4, iii) path dependent models of
endogenous population growth and iv) path dependent models of
endogenous growth.
The advantage and merit of the MRW model is that it is the
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only model in the recent wave of growth theory that has undergone
rigorous estimation and testing until now. Although the results
are fairly good according to general standards, MRWs
sophistication of using three samples has also revealed that the
purely macro-neoclassical approach may be improved by using
arguments from public, international and development economics
presented in this paper.
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